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NOTES

PEACEFUL PICKETING AND UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Are sections 111.06(2) (b) and (e) of the Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act,' which seek to restrict the parties to and the objectives of
peaceful picketing, violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution? The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Retail Clerks'
Union, Local No. 1403, A. F. of L., et al v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board et a12 sustained the constitutionality of these sections.
In this case the Union made unsuccessful attempts to unionize the
employees of the Sears Roebuck store in Racine. None of the store
employees attended the meeting, called, with the consent and approval
of the employer, for the purpose of organizing them into the local
union. Neither the Union nor the employees had any dispute with
Sears Roebuck and Company. Peaceful picketing of the store began
December 4 or 5, 1940, and continued until February 28, 1941, when
it was forbidden by an order of the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board as being in violation of sections 111.06(2) (b) and (e). The
circuit court of Racine County upheld the order of the board. Upon
appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the
lower court, and, in the opinion of the writer, if this case comes before
the United States Supreme Court, it will, in all probability, declare that
sections 111.06(2) (b) and (e) do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The trend apparent from recent Supreme Court decisions in
picketing cases should logically result in such a holding.
When the United States Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabama
held picketing to be an exercise of the right of free speech protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment,4 new labor legislation became imperative. If picketing as a mode of expression were not to be made the
cover for an attack on and a violation of the property rights of others,
restrictions would have to be imposed upon it. However, the state in
"draw' .ng the line beyond which picketing may be prohibited or en111.06(2) (b). It shall be an unfair labor practice: To coerce, intimidate or
induce any employer to interfere with any of his employees in the enjoyment
of their legal rights, including those guaranteed in section 111.04, or to
engage in any practice with regard to his employees which would constitute
an unfair labor practice if undertaken by him on his own initiative.
111,06(2) (e). It shall be an unfair labor practice: To cooperate in, engaging in,
promoting or inducing picketing, boycotting, or any other overt concomitant
of a strike unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the employees
of an employer against whom such acts are primarily directed have voted by
secret ballot to call a strike.
26 N.W. (2d) 699 (Wis. 1941).
8310 U.S. 88; 84 L.Ed. 1093; 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
4"The dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute
1

must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed

by the Constitution. We concur with Mr. Justice Brandeis: 'Members of a

union might without special statutory authorization by a state make known
the facts of a labor dispute for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution."' Thornhill v. Alabama, Supra.

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

joine6 ' has the tortuous task of staying within the Fourteenth Amendment. In protecting the right of others the state must not destroy the
picket.;' right to freedom of speech. The necessary equilibrium is difficult of achievement.
Picketing has three elements: (1) means; (2) parties; (3) aims
or objectives. Picketing characterized by violence (show of force,
blocking of entrances, etc.) is, of course and necessarily so, prohibited.
In Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor
Dairies,Inc.,5 the United States Supreme Court held that a state court
may enjoin picketing in itself peaceful when it is enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct. Furthermore, picketing though p--aceful may be prohibited, if it is characterized by fraud and misrepresentation. Curbing violent picketing has presented no difficulties because it
naturally comes under the police powers of the state. Peaceful picketing, however, presents a more difficult problem and the attempts of
the various states to curb it have so far met with little success.
By section 103.535, commonly referred to as the "Stranger Picketing Act," Wisconsin attempted to restrict picketing to those who were
parties to the labor dispute in question. "It shall be unlawful for anyone to picket, or induce others to picket, the establishment, employer,
supply or delivery vehicles, or customers of anyone engaged in business, or to interfere with his business or interfere with any person or
persons desiring to transact or transacting business with him, when no
labor dispute ... exists between such employer and his employees or
their representatives."
In American Federation of Labor v. Swing6 the United States
Supreme Court passed on the principle involved in 103.535 and indirectly voided that statute as being violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The facts of the Swing case were: That unsuccessful attempts
were made to unionize Swing's beauty parlor. That peaceful picketing
of the shop followed. That the picketing was enjoined by an Illinois
court on the grounds that since there was no dispute between the
employer and his employees, the picketing was illegal. In reversing the
Illinois courts the Supreme Court declared: "A state cannot exclude
workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers
and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly
employed by him. The right of free communication cannot be mutilated
by denying it to workers in a dispute with an employer even though
'
they are not in his employ."
5 312 U.S. 287; 85 L.Ed. 836; 61 S.Ct. 552 (1940).
6312 U.S. 321; 85 L.Ed. 854; 61 S.Ct. 568 (1940).
7 Ibid. at 326.
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Wisconsin through section 111.06(2) (e), the constitutional of which
is still in question, also seeks to limit peaceful picketing to the parties
involved in the controversy. This section provides that picketing is
illegal unless the pickets represent a majority of the employees against
whose employer a strike has been called. Therefore, if only fifty or
fewer (or none) of the hundred employees of X Company vote to call
a strike, picketing by this minority or by others £s under any circumstances illegal and enjoinable. Section 111.06(2) (e) reads: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice to cooperate in, engaging in, promoting or
inducing picketing, boycotting, or any other overt concomitant of a
strikm unless a majority of the employees of an employer against whom
such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot to call
a strike."
The constitutionality of 111.06(2) (e) could have been passed upon
by both the Wisconsin Supreme Court and by the United States
Supreme Court in the Plankinton House case." In this case less than a
majority of the Plankinton employees went on strike and began to
picket the Plankinton House. The Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board issued an order restraining the picketing because it was carried
on in absence of a majority strike vote.9 However, neither the Wisconsin nor the United States Supreme Court decided the case in light of
the order. Both courts sustained the injunction on the grounds that the
picketing was characterized by violence. The United States Supreme
Court relied upon the construction placed upon the Board's order by
the Wisconsin court. The fallacy of this lies in the very evident fact
that "the Board's order, not the Wisconsin decision, was served upon
the pickets, and if the free speech character of picketing is to be given
-full recognition, the order on its face should have been subjected to
appropriate judicial'scrutiny."'10
In Retail Clerks' Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board"
the Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of 111.06
(2) (e). In this case the constitutionality of the statute was specifically
attacked and the court sustained the cease and desist order which
among other findings was based upon the fact that: The defendant
union had done or caused to be done acts prohibited by section 111.06
(2) (e), namely, "cooperating in, engaging in, promoting and inducing
8236 Wis. 329, 294 N.W. 632 (1941); 315 U.S. 437: 86 L.Ed. 946; 62 S.Ct. 65

(1941).

9 "That the respondent unions are guilty of unfair labor practices by co-operating and engaging in promoting and inducing picketing and boycotting, all

being overt concomitants of a strike, without first obtaining the approval of
the majority of the employees of the Plankinton House by a secret ballot."
236 Wis. at 335.
10 Ludwig Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," Harvard Law Review (October,
1942), p. 191.

116 N.W. (2d) 699 (Wis. 1942).
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strike, without first obtaining by secret ballot the approval of a majority of the employees of the Sears Roebuck store (the employer) to
picketing, bannering, boycotting, all being overt concomitants of a
12
call a strike."
Will the United States Supreme Court sustain 111.06(2) (e),
especially in view of the Swing case? In that case the Court declared:
"We are asked to sustain a decree which asserts that there can be no
peaceful picketing or peaceful persuasion in relation to any dispute
between an employer and a trade union unless the employer's own
employees are in controversy with him. Such a bar of free communication is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of speech."' S The
principle of law laid down in the Swing case is that regardless of one's
relation to a labor dispute or lack thereof, he has the right peacefully
to express his opinion and viewpoint on the labor dispute. If we compare the fact situation of the Retail Clerks' Union case with that of the
Swing case, we find the two cases to be almost identical. It would seem
reasonable then to conclude that the Supreme Court on appeal will
decide the Retail Clerks' Union case in light of the same legal principles
and will declare 111.06(2) (e) unconstitutional. Such a decision is
inescapable if the Supreme Court adheres to the principle, which was
laid down in the Thornhill case and reiterated in the Swing case, that
picketing is the exercise of free speech.
15
But Carpenters & Joiners"Union, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe
and Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board16 would indicate that the Supreme Court is tending to
emasculate or, perhaps, to end the identification of picketing with free
speech. In the Ritter's case the Supreme Court sustained a Texas
injunction forbidding picketing before an establishment which industrially had no connection with the labor dispute in question. The Carpenters' Union picketed Ritter's cafe because the contractor building
his house, one and a half miles from the cafe, employed non-union
labor. In the Allen-Bradley case the Supreme Court upheld an order
issued by the Wisconsin Court enjoining the picketing of private
homes. The Union maintained a picket line before the home of a nonstriking employee of the employer with whom the Union was in dispute. The principle of law laid down in these two cases is that peaceful picketing may be illegal if the pickets and the occupant of the place
picketed lack a common business interest. The Supreme Court distinguished the Ritter and the Allen-Bradley cases from the Swing case
Ibid., at 702.
"American Federation of Labor v. Swing, Supra, p. 325.
14237 Wis. 164, 295 N.W. 791 (1941); 315 U.S. 740; 86 L.Ed. 1154; 62 S.Ct. 820
12

1942).

Is315 U.S. 769; 86 L.Ed. 1178; 62 S.Ct. 118 (1942).
16315 U.S. 722; 86 L.Ed. 1143; 62 S.Ct. 111 (1942).
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on the specious grounds that unlike the former the latter involved
parties who were interrelated through a community (nexus) of business interest.
It is difficult to follow the court's line of reasoning. For if picketing
is, as the United States Supreme Court maintains, the exercise of free
speech, then have not pickets the right to speak freely in one locality as
well as in another (if there is neither trespass nor breach of peace)?
If union beauty operators may speak freely in front of Swing's beauty
parlor, even though they have no nexus of employment with him, why
may not union carpenters speak freely in front of Ritter's cafe, even
though they have no nexus- of business interest with him. The lack of
an industrial nexus with Ritter's cafe is no more a valid reason for
depriving the carpenters of their right to freedom of speech before the
cafe, than the lack of a racial nexus with whites would be a justification
for depriving negroes of their right to freedom of speech before a
public forum. The Ritter and the Allen-Bradley cases cannot be brought
into accord with the Swing case.
Under the Swing case section 111.06(2) (e) is quite evidently unconstitutional, but the Ritter and the Allen-Bradley cases mark a
decided departure from the Swing case toward a willingness to permit
the states to restrict the parties involved in picketing. Therefore, the
ruling of these two cases should logically result in a sustainal of section 111.06(2) (e). The clear and irreconcilable divergence of the
Ritter and the Allen-Bradley cases from the Swing case implies a repudiation of the latter by the United States Supreme Court. It would be
sound legal reasoning for the United States Supreme Court to uphold
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Retail Clerks' Union v. the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board.
In addition, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Retail Clerks' Union
v. the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board upheld the constitutionality of 111.06(2) (b). This section provides that picketing is
illegal if the objective in view is to force an employer to interfere with
the legal rights of his employees. Therefore, if the employees of X
Company refuse to join the union, picketing to coerce X Company to
force them to do so by threat of dischargal or otherwise is illegal and
enjoinable. Section 111.06(2) (b) reads: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice to coerce, intimidate, or induce any employer to interfere with
any of his employees in the enjoyment of their legal rights, including those guaranteed in section [employees shall have the right of
self-organization and the right to form, join or assist labor organizations ...and such employees shall have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities-111.04] or to engage in any practice with
regard to his employees which would constitute an unfair labor practice if undertaken by him on his own initiative." This statute was the
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necessary consequence of the American Furniture case and the Senn
case where the courts refused to sustain an injunction against picketing
which admittedly sought to compel the employer to coerce his employees
to join the union.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision is legally correct and
basically sound for it is realistic and appreciative of the true nature of
the picketing enjoined. But will the Wisconsin Court be upheld on
appeal especially in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions and that Court's interpretation of picketing,? This will, in turn,
depend upon the Supreme Court's view of these questions: (1) May
state courts enjoin peaceful picketing carried on for an unlawful objective? (2) May the state without violating the Due Process Clause
forbid peaceful picketing which has for its objective the compelling of
an employer to force his employees to join a union?
A primary principle of the common law is that an individual or a
group of individuals may not seek an illegal object through a legal
means. Therefore, the common law forbids peaceful picketing which
involves a secondary boycott. One may not picket another if his object
in so doing is to drive the other out of business or to do him great harm.
Wisconsin has made use of this principle to forbid picketing, though
peaceful, which seeks an unfair labor practice. While acknowledging
and upholding the legality and the right of peaceful picketing, Wisconsin claims jurisdiction "to subject to injunctive relief any labor
activity, including peaceful picketing, which conflicts with desirable
social and economic policies."
While there is no United States Supreme Court decision determinative of the issue, it would seem that the United States Supreme Court
recognizes the states' right to enjoin peaceful picketing carried on for
an unlawful objective. There is not to be found "in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a constitutional command that
peaceful picketing must be wholly immune from regulation by the
community." Since the Supreme Court in the Ritter and the AllenBradley cases allow the states' right to restrict the locale of peaceful
picketing, by analogy one might conclude that the same Court recognizes the states' right to prohibit certain objectives of peaceful picketing. The dictum in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v.
Wohl17 seems to imply that state courts may enjoin picketing carried
on for an unlawful objective. That case involved a dispute between the
union and "vendors"-independent business men who owned their own
trucks, purchased goods from manufacturers, and sold them to retailers. The union by picketing the manufacturers sought to compel the
17 Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, Supra.
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vendors to employ union members. An injunction was granted and
sustained by the New York courts because no labor dispute was involved under state law. The United States Supreme Court reversed this
judgment on the grounds that the lack of a labor dispute under state
law did not impair the union's constitutional right to free expression
with regard to the facts of an industrial controversy. Wohl contended
that the term "labor dispute" was to be interpreted in light of Opera
on Tour, Inc. v. Weber' 8 where the New York Court of Appeals,
speaking of the Wohl case, stated: "We held that it was an unlawful
objective to attempt to coerce a peddler employing no employees in his
business and making approximately thirty-two dollars a week, to hire
an employee at nine dollars a day for one day a week."' 9 The Supreme
Court refused to rely upon this interpretation because "this lacks the
deliberateness and formality of a certification"20 and because the
quoted words were "uttered in a case where the question of the existence of a right to free speech under the Fourteenth Amendment was
neither raised nor considered."'n Apparently, then, the Supreme Court
would have ruled otherwise had the New York Court in the Wohl case
made a finding that the picketing was for an unlawful labor objective.
Finally, freedom of speech is not license as to its objectives. To advocate the violent overthrow of our government or to encourage resistance to the United States in time of war may certainly be prohibited.
Now, if peaceful picketing is freedom of speech, it likewise may seek
only lawful objectives.
The question as to whether or not the state may without violating
the due process clause forbid peaceful picketing which has for its
objective the compelling of an employer to force his employees to join
a union is still to be determined by the United States Supreme Court.
The picketing in the Swing case sought the compulsory unionization of
employees who had refused to join the union. The United States
Supreme Court impliedly ruled favorably on the objective in that it
permitted the picketing to continue. But the Ritter and the AllenBradley cases have substantially altered the judicial interpretation of
picketing apparent in the Swing case. Texas and Wisconsin were permitted to restrict picketing to the locale involved in the dispute on the
grounds that the right to picket may be qualified by considerations of
public policy. Moreover, the Thornhill case, which placed picketing
under the Fourteenth Amendment, emphatically stated: "The rights
of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to
compete with others for a share in the products of industry are subject
N.Y. 348, 34 N.E. (2d) 349 (1941).
Ibid., at 363.
Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, Supra, at p. 774.
21 Ibid., at 775.
1s 285
19
20
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to modification or qualification in the interests of the society in which
they exist."2 2 Wisconsin enacted 111.06(2) (b) to obviate the injustice
and detriment to the general welfare occasioned by the Senn and the
American Furniture cases. Beyond cavil, Wisconsin has the right and
the duty to protect the rights not only of union employees but also of
non-union employees. Section 111.04, giving employees the right to
refrain from joining the union, would be nugatory if their unionization
could be compelled by coercing the employer through picketing. In
addition, the employer is obligated by section 111.06(2) to respect the
rights of his non-union employees given them by section 111.04. If the
employer is not free to carry out his obligation, then an impasse must
result which will be harmful to the common good. Therefore, the general welfare of Wisconsin is best served by forbidding peaceful picketing which has for its objective the compelling of an employer to force
his employees to join a union. For these reasons it is the opinion of the
writer that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's ruling in Retail Clerks'
Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board will be sustained.
The unreserved declaration in the Thornhill case that peaceful
picketing is freedom of speech and its practical effectuation in the
Swing case placed the United States Supreme Court in an untenable
position. The identification of picketing with free speech would prevent any effective restriction of picketing by the states. In effect the
pickets could picket for what, against whom, and where they pleased.
Knowing that this would work incalculable harm and injustice, the
United States Supreme Court tacitly admitted in the Ritter and the
Allen-Bradley cases that picketing is, at most, akin to free speech. In
the Wohl case, Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion stated:
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speeh, since it
involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of
the picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence,
those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regula23
tion.1
Indeed picketing is more than free speech, it is a form of economic
pressure. The purpose of the picket line is not to interchange ideas and
opinions, but to prevent the delivery and purchase of goods and thereby
to force the employer to comply with the union's wishes. Union members will not pass the picket line regardless of their relation to the
employer. Customers naturally are reluctant to deal with an embattled
business. "The only intellectual conviction to which picketing leads is
22Thornhill v. Alabama, Supra, at p. 103.

23 Bakery and Pastry Workers v. Wohl, Supra, at p. 776.
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the understanding that if the picketed enterprise does not give in, it
will eventually wish it had." 24
The realization that picketing is basically coercive in nature and,
for that reason, that it must be regulated in terms of such principles
of the law of torts as lawful purpose, just cause, and proper parties
caused the Wisconsin Supreme Court to sustain sections 111.06(2)
(b) and (e) as constitutional. The Ritter, Allen-Bradley, and Wohl
cases indicate that the United States Supreme Court is now appreciative of the true character of picketing. If Retail Clerks' Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board comes before the United States
Supreme Court, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court will be
affirmed and sections 111.06(2) (b) and (e) will be declared
constitutional.
THOMAS McDERmoT.

24

Gregory, "Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech," 26 A.B.A.J. (1940),
at 710.

